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Abstract
Karni and Vierø (2013) propose a model of belief revision under growing awareness
reverse Bayesianism which posits that as a person becomes aware of new acts, conse-
quences, or act-consequence links, she revises her beliefs over an expanded state space
in a way that preserves the relative likelihoods of events in the original state space. A
key limitation of the model is that reverse Bayesianism alone does not fully determine
the revised probability distribution. We provide an assumption act independence
that imposes additional restrictions on reverse Bayesian belief revision. We show that
under act independence, knowledge of the probabilities of new events in the expanded
state space is su¢ cient to fully determine the revised probability distribution in each
case of growing awareness. We thereby operationalize the reverse Bayesian model for
applications. To illustrate how act independence operationalizes reverse Bayesianism,
we consider the law and economics problem of optimal safety regulation.
JEL codes: D83, K23.
Keywords: act independence, reverse Bayesianism, safety regulation, unawareness.
Corresponding author: Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Georgetown University, 600 New Jersey Avenue NW,
Washington, DC 20001 (jct48@georgetown.edu). We thank the editor and the referees for their helpful
comments. We also thank Jonah Gelbach, Tim Friehe, Simon Grant, John Mikhail, David Reinstein, Steve
Salop, Steve Shavell, Larry Solum, Marie-Louise Vierø, and participants at the following conferences and
seminars: the Law and Ambiguity Workshop at the University of Exeter, the Decisions, Markets, and
Networks conference at Cornell University, the 34th Annual Conference of the European Association of Law
and Economics, Bielefeld University, Towson University, Université Paris Nanterre, Universität Bonn, the
2018 Annual Meeting of the AALS Section on Law and Economics, the 28th Annual Meeting of the American
Law and Economics Association, the 2018 Foundations of Utility and Risk Conference, the 8th Annual Law
and Economics Theory Conference, Australian National University, and the University of Auckland.
1 Introduction
Overview. Economists traditionally model choice under uncertainty according to Sav-
ages theory of subjective expected utility (Savage, 1954). Savages theory posits a space of
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive states of the world, representing all possible
resolutions of uncertainty. It assumes that when a person chooses an act, although she is
uncertain about the true state of the world and therefore about the consequences of her
chosen act, she nevertheless has complete knowledge of the state space she knows all the
possible acts and all the possible consequences of each and every act.
In reality, however, a person often does not have complete knowledge of the state space.
This is known as unawareness. A person may be unaware of some acts, some consequences,
or that a known act can cause a known consequence. An extreme example of the latter
is that no one was aware that supporting anti-Soviet ghters in Afghanistan in the 1980s
could lead to the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001. Unawareness creates the
possibility of growing awareness the expansion of the state space when a person discovers
a new act, consequence, or act-consequence link. Examples include the discovery of a new
product or technology (new act), the discovery of a new disease or injury (new consequence),
or the discovery that a known product can cause a known injury (new act-consequence link).
"Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than the lack of information" (Schip-
per, 2014a,b). There is a fundamental di¤erence between not knowing the state of the world
(lack of information) and not knowing that a state of the world is possible (lack of concep-
tion). The Savage model allows the state space to contract with the arrival of information
and is consistent with Bayesian updating of beliefs. It however does not admit unawareness
and cannot accommodate growing awareness (Dekel et al., 1998a,b).
In a pioneering article, Karni and Vierø (2013) propose a model of belief revision under
growing awareness called reverse Bayesianism. Reverse Bayesianism posits that as a person
becomes aware of a new act, consequence, or act-consequence link, she revises her beliefs
in a way that preserves the relative likelihoods of events in the original state space. More
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specically, the model postulates that (i) in the case of a new act or consequence, probability
mass shifts proportionally away from the events in the original state space to the new events
in the expanded state space, and (ii) in the case of a new act-consequence link, null events
in the original state space become non-null, and probability mass shifts proportionally away
from the original non-null events to the original null events that become non-null.
The reverse Bayesian model has (at least) two features that make it attractive to econo-
mists who wish to incorporate unawareness and growing awareness into applications. The
rst is transparency. Karni and Vierø (2013) provide an axiomatic foundation for the model,
so one can judge the theory by the axioms.1 The second attractive feature of the model is
its accessibility. The model is built upon a choice-theoretic framework that is well known
to economists (subjective expected utility theory), and the upshot is a belief revision theory
that mirrors the familiar process of Bayesian updating.2
A key limitation of the reverse Bayesian model, however, is that reverse Bayesianism
alone does not fully determine the revised probability distribution over the expanded state
space. This is because reverse Bayesianism implies restrictions on the revised probabilities
of non-null events in the original state space, but not on the probabilities of new events
in the expanded state space. To borrow a term from the econometrics literature, reverse
Bayesianism only partially identies the revised probability distribution.3
In this paper, we provide an assumption act independence that implies additional
restrictions on the revised probability distribution in the reverse Bayesian model. Essentially,
act independence requires that acts are independent experiments. We show that under act
independence, knowledge of the probabilities of new events in the expanded state space is
1The key axioms of the model are the consistency axioms, which essentially require that preferences
conditional on the original state of awareness are not altered by growing awareness.
2This feature prompts Dominiak and Tserenjigmid (2018, p. 3) to describe Karni and Vierøs (2013)
reverse Bayesian model as elegant.
3Karni and Vierø (2013, p. 2805) highlight this feature of reverse Bayesianism in their concluding remarks:
The model presented in this article predicts that, as awareness grows and the state space expands, the
relative likelihoods of events in the original state space remain unchanged. The model is silent about the
absolute levels of these probabilities. In other words, our theory does not predict the probability of the new
events in the expanded state space.
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su¢ cient to fully determine the revised probability distribution over the expanded state
space in each case of growing awareness (a new act, consequence, or act-consequence link).
In this way, act independence makes the reverse Bayesian model operational for economic
applications. This is our main contribution.
After introducing act independence into the reverse Bayesian model, we illustrate how it
operationalizes reverse Bayesianism with an application in the eld of law and economics.
In our application, we study the problem faced by a safety regulator who is tasked with
regulating the risky activities of a company. For instance, the regulator could be an environ-
mental agency (such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or the U.K. Environment
Agency) or a health agency (such as the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
or Public Health England). We analyze how the regulator revises her beliefs about the risk
of each activity, and in turn the safety standards for each activity, in the wake of growing
awareness. We consider each case of growing awareness and then discuss the importance of
the act independence assumption for the analysis of each case.
Related literature. The unawareness literature was pioneered by Fagin and Halpern
(1988). Other early contributions include Modica and Rustichini (1994, 1999), Dekel et al.
(1998b), Halpern (2001), Heifetz et al. (2006), and Halpern and Rêgo (2008). The early
papers in the literature generally pursued an epistemic approach or a game-theoretic ap-
proach. Surveys of these papers are provided by Schipper (2014b) (which o¤ers a gentle
introductionto the literature) and Schipper (2015) (which provides an extended review).
Karni and Vierø (2013) are among the pioneers of the choice-theoretic approach (i.e., the
state-space approach) to modeling unawareness. Subsequent papers build on their approach.
For instance, Grant et al. (2019) invoke their approach to model learning by experimentation
in a world with unawareness; Karni and Vierø (2015, 2017) extend their model to the cases
where the decision maker is probabilistically sophisticated (but does not necessarily abide
by expected utility theory) and where she anticipates her growing awareness; and Dominiak
and Tserenjigmid (2018) generalize their model such that the decision maker perceives am-
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biguity in the wake of growing awareness.4 Karni and Vierø (2013, 2017) and Dominiak and
Tserenjigmid (2018) survey the papers that take a choice-theoretic approach.
A handful of papers apply unawareness models to study legal topics. The bulk of these
focus on contracts. For example, Board and Chung (2011) argue that asymmetric unaware-
ness provides a justication for the contra proferentem doctrine of contract interpretation,
which provides that ambiguous terms in a contract should be construed against the drafter;
Zhao (2011) argues that unawareness may explain the existence of force majeure clauses
in contracts; Grant et al. (2012) study aspects of di¤erential awareness that give rise to
contractual disputes; Filiz-Ozbay (2012) posits asymmetric awareness as a reason for the
incompleteness of contracts; von Thadden and Zhao (2012, 2014) study the properties of
optimal contracts under moral hazard when the agent may be partially unaware of her ac-
tion space; and Auster (2013) introduces asymmetric unawareness into the canonical moral
hazard model and analyzes the properties of the optimal contract.
Structure of the paper. Section 2 presents the reverse Bayesian model. Section 3 in-
troduces the act independence assumption into the model and derives our main results.
Section 4 contains our safety regulation application. Section 5 o¤ers concluding remarks.
The Appendix collects the proofs of all theorems.
2 Reverse Bayesian Model
The primitives of the reverse Bayesian model are a nite, non-empty set F of feasible acts
and a nite, non-empty set Z of feasible consequences. States are functions from the set of
acts to the set of consequences. A state assigns a consequence to each act. The set of all
4More specically, Dominiak and Tserenjigmid (2018) provide a theory of choice under growing aware-
ness in which subjective expected utility preferences (with unawareness) extend to maxmin expected utility
preferences (without unawareness). They however leave unexplained how beliefs revise with further informa-
tion. In our paper the decision maker has subjective expected utility preferences with possible unawareness
before and after discovering a new act, consequence, or link and revising her beliefs. This framework could
potentially be extended to multiple rounds of discovery and belief revision, if required.
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possible states, ZF , denes the conceivable state space. With m acts and n consequences,
there are nm conceivable states.
The decision maker originally conceives the set of acts to be F = ff1; : : : ; fmg and the set
of consequences to be Z = fz1; : : : ; zng. The conceivable state space is ZF = fs1; : : : ; snmg,
where each state s 2 ZF is a vector of length m, the ith element of which, si, is the
consequence zj 2 Z produced by act fi 2 F in that state of the world.
An act-consequence link, or link, is a causal relationship between an act and a conse-
quence. The conceivable state space admits all conceivable links. However, the decision
maker may perceive one or more links as infeasible, which brings her to nullify the states
that admit such link. We refer to these as null states and denote them by N  ZF . Taking
only the non-null states denes the feasible state space, S  ZFnN . There are Qmi=1(n  i)
feasible states, where i denotes the number of nullied links involving act fi.
The decision makers beliefs are represented by a probability measure p on the conceivable
state space, ZF . The support of p is the feasible state space, S. That is, p(s) > 0 for all
s 2 S and p(s) = 0 for all s 2 N .
The decision maker may initially fail to conceive one or more acts or consequences or to
perceive as feasible one or more conceivable links. We refer to such failures of conception
or perception as unawareness. However, the decision maker may later discover a new act or
consequence, which expands both the feasible state space and the conceivable state space,
or a new link, which expands the feasible state space but not the conceivable state space.5
We refer to such discoveries and expansions as growing awareness.
To illustrate, suppose S = ZF and the decision maker discovers a new consequence, zn+1.
Then the set of consequences becomes bZ = Z [ fzn+1g and the feasible and conceivable
state spaces both expand to bS = bZF = fs1; : : : ; s(n+1)mg, where each state remains a vector
of length m. Alternatively, suppose the decision maker discovers a new act, fm+1. Then
the set of acts becomes bF = F [ ffm+1g and the feasible and conceivable state spaces both
5To be clear, by newwe mean not previously conceived in the case of acts and consequences, and
previously conceived but perceived as infeasiblein the case of links.
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expand to bS = Z bF = fs1; : : : ; sn(m+1)g, where each state now is a vector of length m + 1.
Lastly, suppose S  ZF because (and only because) the decision maker initially perceives
as infeasible the link from f1 to zn. Discovery of the link from f1 to zn does not alter the
conceivable state space, but the feasible state space expands to coincide with the conceivable
state space: bS = ZF . Section 4 contains illustrative depictions of conceivable and feasible
state spaces and their expansion due to the discovery of new acts, consequences, and links.
In the wake of growing awareness, the decision maker revises her beliefs in a way that
preserves the relative likelihoods of the events in the original feasible state space (the non-null
events in the original conceivable state space). In each case of growing awareness, probability
mass shifts proportionally away from the events in the original feasible state space to the
new events in the expanded feasible state space. In the case of a new act or consequence,
the new events in the expanded feasible state space are also new events in the expanded
conceivable state space. In the case of a new link, the new events in the expanded feasible
state space are the null events in the original conceivable state space that become non-null.
Karni and Vierø (2013) refer to this belief revision process as reverse Bayesianism. Let bp
denote the decision makers revised beliefs on the expanded feasible state space, bS. Formally,
reverse Bayesianism implies two restrictions on bp: (i) in the case of a new consequence or
link, p(s)=p(t) = bp(s)=bp(t) for all s; t 2 S; and (ii) in the case of a new act, p(s)=p(t) =
bp(E(s))=bp(E(t)) for all s; t 2 S, where E(s) denotes the event in bS that corresponds to state
s 2 S; that is, given a new act fm+1, E(s)  ft 2 bS : ti = si for all i 6= m+ 1g.
3 Act Independence
We add an assumption to the reverse Bayesian model act independence. Let Ai(zj)  bS
denote the event that fi yields zj; that is, Ai(zj)  ft 2 bS : ti = zjg. We refer to events of
this type as act events. We assume that act events are statistically independent.
Act independence. Ai(zj) ? Ai0(zj0) for all i and i0 where i 6= i0 and all j and j0.
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Act independence implies additional restrictions on the decision makers revised beliefs, bp.
Take any event E  bS. We can express each state s = (s1; : : : ; sm) 2 E as the intersection
of a unique collection of act events in bS: s = TiAi(si). Act independence implies thatbp(s) = Qi bp (Ai(si)) for all s 2 E.
Growing awareness whether it entails a new act, consequence, or link gives rise to one
or more new act events in bS. In the remainder of this section we show that, under act
independence, knowledge of the probabilities of the new act events in bS is su¢ cient to fully
determine bp in each case of growing awareness. We start with the case of a new link.
3.1 New Link
Suppose S  ZF and the decision maker discovers a new link from fl to zk for some l 2
f1; : : : ;mg and k 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Let bS denote the expanded feasible state space and bp denote
the decision makers revised beliefs on bS. Observe that bS = S [, where  = Al(zk) is the
newly discovered event that fl yields zk. Intuitively,  is a copy of any one of the act events
Al(zj) in S, except that fl yields zk (instead of zj) in every state in . We assume that, by
virtue of the discovery, the decision maker learns that fl yields zk with probability  > 0.
By dention,  = bp().
For each state s 2 , let L(s)  ft 2 S : ti = si; 8 i 6= lg denote the event in S that
corresponds to the state s 2 . In other words, L(s) comprises the states in S in which
every act (other than fl) yields the same consequence that it yields in state s 2 .
By reverse Bayesianism, the relative likelihoods of the states in S are preserved: p(s)=p(t) =
bp(s)=bp(t) for all s; t 2 S. By act independence, the probability of each state in  equals
the product of the probabilities of the act events in bS whose intersection denes such state:
bp(s) = Qmi=1 bp (Ai(si)) for all s = (s1; : : : ; sm) 2 . It follows that:
Theorem 1. In the case of a new link involving fl:
(i) bp(s) = (1  )p(s) for all s 2 S; and
(ii) bp(s) = p (L(s)) for all s 2 .
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Theorem 1 says that (i) the fraction  of the probability mass of each state in S is taken
away, and that (ii) the total probability mass  taken away from the states in S is distributed
among the states in  in proportion to the probability masses of their corresponding events
in S. Reverse Bayesianism dictates the rst result (how probability mass is shifted away
from the states in S), while act independence dictates the second result (how the shifted
probability mass is apportioned among the states in ). Together, reverse Bayesianism and
act independence fully determine the revised probability distribution bp on bS.6
3.2 New Act
Next, suppose S  ZF and the decision maker discovers a new act, fm+1. Again, let bS
denote the expanded feasible state space and bp denote the decision makers revised beliefs
on bS. Observe that bS = Snj=1 j, where j = Am+1(zj) is the newly discovered event that
fm+1 yields zj. Intuitively, each j is an augmented copy of S in which fm+1 yields zj in
every state. We assume that, by virtue of the discovery, the decision maker learns that fm+1
yields zj with probability j > 0 for all j = 1; : : : ; n.7 Note that j = bp(j) andPnj=1 j = 1.
For each state s 2 S, let E(s)  ft 2 bS : ti = si; 8 i 6= m + 1g denote the event inbS that corresponds to the state s 2 S. In other words, E(s) comprises the states in bS in
which every act (other than fm+1) yields the same consequence that it yields in state s 2 S.
Observe that bS = Ss2S E(s), where E(s) comprises n states, one in which fm+1 yields z1,
one in which fm+1 yields z2, and so forth. Index the states in each E(s) by j = 1; : : : ; n,
such that sj 2 E(s) is the state in E(s) in which fm+1 yields zj. The connection between
the sets of events fE(s) : s 2 Sg and fj : j = 1; : : : ; ng, both of which partition bS, is that
j collects the jth state from each E(s).
By reverse Bayesianism, p(s)=p(t) = bp(E(s))=bp(E(t)) for all s; t 2 S. By act indepen-
dence, bp(s) = Qm+1i=1 bp (Ai(si)) for all s = (s1; : : : ; sm+1) 2 bS. It follows that:
6Note that p is the Bayesian update of bp conditional on the event S; hence the term reverse Bayesianism.
7Assuming j > 0 for all j = 1; : : : ; n is without loss of generality. We can deal with the case where j = 0
for some j by assuming j > 0 for the rst k < n and changing n to k as necessary in the statements below.
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Theorem 2. In the case of a new act fm+1, for all s 2 S and corresponding E(s)  bS,bp(sj) = jp(s) for all sj 2 E(s), j = 1; : : : ; n.
Here is the intuition behind Theorem 2. After the discovery of fm+1, each state s 2 S
is split into n states sj 2 bS, one for each consequence zj, j = 1; : : : ; n. (In state sj, fm+1
yields zj.) These n states comprise the event E(s)  bS that corresponds to the state s 2 S.
For each state s 2 S, reverse Bayesianism dictates that its probability mass is shifted to the
corresponding event E(s)  bS, while act independence dictates that the fraction j of the
shifted probability mass is apportioned to state sj 2 E(s) for all j = 1; : : : ; n.
3.3 New Consequence
Last, suppose S  ZF and the decision maker discovers a new consequence, zn+1. Once
again, let bS denote the expanded feasible state space and bp denote the decision makers
revised beliefs on bS. Observe that bS = S [, where  = Smi=1Ai(zn+1) is the union of the
newly discovered events that fi yields zn+1 for all i = 1; : : : ;m. We assume that, by virtue
of the discovery, the decision maker learns that fi yields zn+1 with probability i > 0 for all
i = 1; : : : ;m.8 That is, i = bp(Ai(zn+1)). Let  = bp() and note that 1   = Qmi=1(1  i).
For each state s 2 , let I(s)  fi 2 f1; : : : ;mg : si = zn+1g denote the indices of the
acts that yield zn+1 in that state of the world, and let I(s)  fi 2 f1; : : : ;mg : si 6= zn+1g
denote the indices of the acts that do not yield zn+1 in that state of the world.9 In addition,
for each s 2 , let C(s)  ft 2 S : ti = si; 8 i 2 I(s)g denote the event in S that corresponds
to s 2  on I(s). In other words, C(s) comprises the states in S in which every act (other
than the acts that yield zn+1) yields the same consequence that it yields in state s 2 .
By reverse Bayesianism, p(s)=p(t) = bp(s)=bp(t) for all s; t 2 S. By act independence,
bp(s) = Qmi=1 bp (Ai(si)) for all s = (s1; : : : ; sm) 2 . It follows that:
8Assuming i > 0 for all i is without loss of generality. We can deal with the case where i = 0 for some
i by assuming i > 0 for the rst l < m and changing m to l as necessary in the statements below.
9Section 4.4 contains examples of the sets I(s) and I(s).
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Theorem 3. In the case of a new consequence zn+1:
(i) bp(s) = (Qmi=1(1  i)) p(s) for all s 2 S;
(ii) bp(s) = Qi2I(s) iQi2I(s)(1  i) p (C(s)) for all s 2  such that I(s)  f1; : : : ;mg;
(iii) bp(s) = Qmi=1 i for the s 2  such that I(s) = f1; : : : ;mg.
Theorem 3 is similar to Theorem 1. The rst result says that the fraction  of the
probability mass of each state in S is taken away. (Recall that 1    = Qmi=1(1   i).)
This result is dictated by reverse Bayesianism. The second and third results say how the
total probability mass  taken away from the states in S is distributed among the states
in . These results are dictated by act independence. Specically, the third results says
that probability mass
Qm
i=1 i is apportioned to the one state in which every act results
in zn+1 (this is a clear implication of act independence), while the second result says that
the remaining probability mass,   Qmi=1 i, is distributed among the other states in  in
proportion to the probability masses of their corresponding events in S.
4 Application: Safety Regulation
In this section, we illustrate how act independence operationalizes reverse Bayesianism with
an application in the eld of law and economics. Unawareness plays an important role in
many legal contexts. A prime example is that parties may write incomplete contracts due to
unforeseen contingencies.10 In our application, we study the implications of unawareness and
growing awareness for the problem of setting legal standards of conduct in safety regulation.11
Examples of growing awareness that are relevant to safety regulation include, just to
name a few, the development of modern day hydraulic fracturing, or fracking,in the late
1990s (Gold, 2014) (new act); the discovery of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s (U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2011) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or mad cow
10See, e.g., Filiz-Ozbay (2012).
11Although we focus on the context of safety regulation, we note that the problem of setting legal standards
of conduct arises in numerous other legal contexts, such as criminal law and tort law, and that our analysis
in this section can be adapted to such contexts.
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disease,in the late 1980s (Collee and Bradley, 1997) (new consequences); and the discovery
of links between Agent Orange and cancer after the Vietnam War (National Academies
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018) and between American football and chronic
traumatic encephalopathy in the late 2000s (Lindsley, 2017) (new links).
4.1 Model of Safety Regulation
Consider the problem faced by a safety regulator who is tasked with regulating the activities
of a company. For instance, the regulator could be an environmental agency regulating
the fracking operations of an energy company or a health agency regulating the screening
practices of a blood bank. Suppose that, as far as the regulator is aware, the situation is
as follows.12 The company can engage in two activities, f1 and f2. Each activity has the
potential to cause harm to others, though the outcomes of the activities are independent.
This is the act independence assumption.13 There are two potential degrees of harm, z1 = 0
and z2 > 0. Activity fi yields harm zj with probability ij, where i1 + i2 = 1 for i = 1; 2.
Thus, activity fis expected harm is i1z1 + i2z2 = i2z2.
Given that F = ff1; f2g and Z = f0; z2g, the conceivable state space, ZF , comprises four
states: s1 = (0; 0), s2 = (0; z2), s3 = (z2; 0), and s4 = (z2; z2). Suppose, for the moment, that
the regulator perceives both activities as risky (i.e., ij > 0 for all i; j). Then the feasible
state space is S = ZF . Let pk  p(sk), k = 1; : : : ; 4, denote the regulators beliefs on S. We
can depict S and p as follows:
p p1 p2 p3 p4
FnS s1 s2 s3 s4
f1 0 0 z2 z2
f2 0 z2 0 z2 :
12Throughout the application, we consider the perspective of the regulator. We assume that the companys
awareness and beliefs always coincide with those of the regulators.
13While act independence is a reasonable assumption in many settings, there undoubtedly are settings in
which it is not. We explore the implications of relaxing the act indpendence assumption in Section 4.5.
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Observe that 11 = p1 + p2, 12 = p3 + p4, 21 = p1 + p3, and 22 = p2 + p4. We assume that
(i) when the regulator is fully aware, she has correct beliefs about each harm probability, ij,
and (ii) when the regulator is unaware of an act, consequence, or link, her beliefs, although
incorrect with respect to the absolute likelihoods of events, are nevertheless correct with
respect to the relative likelihoods of non-null events.14
For each activity fi, the company can take safety precautions, or care, to reduce the
activitys expected harm. The cost to the company of taking level of care xi 2 [0; 1] is
c(xi) = (xi)
2. Taking care reduces the activitys expected harm at a constant rate: hi(xi) =
i2z2(xi), where (xi) = (1  xi). We assume that c() and () are known to the regulator
and are the same for all activities.15
The regulators problem is to set a standard of care, x = (x1; x2) that minimizes the
social costs of the companys activities (the costs of care plus the expected harms):16
minimize
x1;x2
[c(x1) + h1(x1)] + [c(x2) + h2(x2)]
such that x1 2 [0; 1] and x2 2 [0; 1]:
The solution ex = (ex1; ex2) is given implicitly by the rst order conditions
c0(exi) =  h0i(exi); i = 1; 2;
and is given explicitly by
exi = i2z2
2
; i = 1; 2:
We refer to exi as the e¢ cient level of care for activity fi. It is the level of care at which the
marginal cost of care equals the marginal benet (the marginal reduction in expected harm).
14Without the second assumption, the regulator could not have correct beliefs when she becomes fully
aware, which would violate the rst assumption.
15We make the latter assumption for simplicity; it is without loss of generality given the former.
16We leave aside the problem of optimal enforcement (Becker, 1968) and assume that the company always
complies with the standard of care set by the regulator.
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4.2 New Link
We start with the case of a new link. To illustrate this case, we assume that the regulator
initially perceives activity f1 as safe and activity f2 as risky. That is, we assume the regulator
initially perceives the event  = fs3; s4g as infeasible (null). This implies p3 = p4 = 0. We
can depict the original feasible state space, S  ZF , as follows:
p p1 p2
FnS s1 s2
f1 0 0
f2 0 z2 :
Given S and p, the e¢ cient levels of care are
ex1 = 0 and ex2 = p2z2
2
;
and the regulator sets x1 = ex1 and x2 = ex2 as the standards of care for f1 and f2, respectively.
Suppose the regulator discovers that activity f1 is risky. For instance, suppose the com-
pany engages in f1 and it result in harm z2. The feasible state space expands to bS = S [
and the regulator revises her beliefs from p to bp:
bp bp1 bp2 bp3 bp4
FnbS s1 s2 s3 s4
f1 0 0 z2 z2
f2 0 z2 0 z2 :
Observe that for each state s in  there is an event L(s) in S that corresponds with s on
activity f2. Specically, L(s3) = fs1g and L(s4) = fs2g.
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We assume that, by virtue of the discovery, the regulator learns that f1 yields harm z2
with probability  > 0. By denition,  = bp() = bp3 + bp4. It follows from Theorem 1 that
the revised probability distribution bp is given by:
Proposition 1. bp1 = (1  )p1; bp2 = (1  )p2; bp3 = p1; and bp4 = p2.
Given bS and bp, the e¢ cient levels of care are
bex1 = (bp3 + bp4) z2
2
=
z2
2
and bex2 = (bp2 + bp4)z2
2
=
p2z2
2
:
Note that bex1 > ex1 but bex2 = ex2. Thus, the discovery that f1 is risky necessitates the
stipulation of a new standard of care for f1 but not for f2.
4.3 New Act
We next consider the case of a new act. We assume that S = ZF :
p p1 p2 p3 p4
FnS s1 s2 s3 s4
f1 0 0 z2 z2
f2 0 z2 0 z2 :
Given S and p, the e¢ cient levels of care are
ex1 = (p3 + p4)z2
2
and ex2 = (p2 + p4)z2
2
;
and the regulator sets x1 = ex1 and x2 = ex2 as the standards of care for f1 and f2, respectively.
Suppose the regulator discovers a new activity, f3, which can cause harm. For instance,
suppose the company invents and engages in f3 and it results in harm z2. The expanded
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feasible state space is bS = 1 [2, where 1 = fs1; s2; s3; s4g and 2 = fs5; s6; s7; s8g:
bp bp1 bp2 bp3 bp4 bp5 bp6 bp7 bp8
FnbS s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
f1 0 0 z2 z2 0 0 z2 z2
f2 0 z2 0 z2 0 z2 0 z2
f3 0 0 0 0 z2 z2 z2 z2 :
Observe that 1 is an augmented copy of S in which f3 yields no harm in every state,
and that 2 is an augmented copy of S in which f3 yields harm z2 in every state. Stated
di¤erently, each state in S is split into two depending on whether f3 yields no harm or
harm z2. Thus, for each state s in S there is a corresponding event E(s) in bS. Specically,
E(s1) = fs1; s5g, E(s2) = fs2; s6g, E(s3) = fs3; s7g, and E(s4) = fs4; s8g.
We assume that, by virtue of the discovery, the regulator learns that f3 yields harm z2
with probability  > 0. Thus, 1  = bp(1) = bp1+bp2+bp3+bp4 and  = bp(2) = bp5+bp6+bp7+bp8.
It follows from Theorem 2 that the revised probability distribution bp is given by:
Proposition 2. bp1 = (1  )p1; bp2 = (1  )p2; bp3 = (1  )p3; bp4 = (1  )p4;bp5 = p1; bp6 = p2; bp7 = p3; and bp8 = p4:
Given bS and bp, the e¢ cient levels of care are
bex1 = (bp3 + bp4 + bp7 + bp8) z2
2
=
(p3 + p4)z2
2
;
bex2 = (bp2 + bp4 + bp6 + bp8) z2
2
=
(p2 + p4)z2
2
;
and bex3 = (bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8) z2
2
=
z2
2
:
Thus, the discovery of f3 necessitates the stipulation of a new standard of care, bx3, but it
does not necessitate the stipulation of a new standards of care for f1 or f2.
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4.4 New Consequence
We last consider the case of a new consequence. As above, we assume that S = ZF :
p p1 p2 p3 p4
FnS s1 s2 s3 s4
f1 0 0 z2 z2
f2 0 z2 0 z2 :
Given S and p, the e¢ cient levels of care are
ex1 = (p3 + p4)z2
2
and ex2 = (p2 + p4)z2
2
;
and the regulator sets x1 = ex1 and x2 = ex2 as the standards of care for f1 and f2, respectively.
Suppose the regulator discovers a new consequence, z3 > z2, which she links to f1 and
f2. For instance, suppose the company engages in f1 and f2 and each results in harm z3.
The expanded feasible state space is bS = S [, where  = fs5; s6; s7; s8; s9g:
bp bp1 bp2 bp3 bp4 bp5 bp6 bp7 bp8 bp9
FnbS s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
f1 0 0 z2 z2 z3 z3 0 z2 z3
f2 0 z2 0 z2 0 z2 z3 z3 z3 :
Observe that for each state s in  there is an event C(s) in S that corresponds with s on
the activity that does not yield harm z3. Specically, C(s5) = fs1; s3g, C(s6) = fs2; s4g,
C(s7) = fs1; s2g, C(s8) = fs3; s4g, and C(s8) = f;g.17
We assume that, by virtue of the discovery, the regulator learns that activity f1 yields
harm z3 with probability  > 0 and that activity f2 yields harm z3 with probability  > 0.
17In this example, I(s5) = I(s6) = f1g, I(s7) = I(s8) = f2g, and I(s9) = f1; 2g. Accordingly, I(s5) =
I(s6) = f2g, I(s7) = I(s8) = f1g, and I(s9) = f;g.
16
By defnition,  = bp5 + bp6 + bp9 and  = bp7 + bp8 + bp9. It follows from Theorem 3 that the
revised probability distribution bp is given by:
Proposition 3. bp1 = (1 )(1 )p1; bp2 = (1 )(1 )p2; bp3 = (1 )(1 )p3;bp4 = (1  )(1  )p4; bp5 = (1  )(p1 + p3); bp6 = (1  )(p2 + p4);bp7 = (1  )(p1 + p2); bp8 = (1  )(p3 + p4); and bp9 = .
Let  = bp() = bp5+bp6+bp7+bp8+bp9. Note that  = +  and 1  = (1 )(1 ).
We can rewrite bp in terms of  as follows:
Corollary 1. bp1 = (1  )p1; bp2 = (1  )p2; bp3 = (1  )p3; bp4 = (1  )p4;bp5 = 1 (1  )(p1 + p3) = (   )(p1 + p3); bp6 = 1 (1  )(p2 + p4) = (   )(p2 + p4);bp7 = 1  (1  )(p1 + p2) = (   )(p1 + p2); bp8 = 1  (1  )(p3 + p4) = (   )(p3 + p4);
and bp9 =  +    .
Given bS and bp, the e¢ cient levels of care are
bex1 = (bp3 + bp4 + bp8)z2 + (bp5 + bp6 + bp9)z3
2
=
(1  )(p3 + p4)z2 + z3
2
and bex2 = (bp2 + bp4 + bp6)z2 + (bp7 + bp8 + bp9)z3
2
=
(1  )(p2 + p4)z2 + z3
2
:
Note that bex1 > ex1 and bex2 > ex2. Thus, the discovery of z3 necessitates the stipulation of new
standards of care for both f1 and f2.
4.5 Act Independence
We conclude our application with a few remarks about the importance of act independence.
As previously noted, reverse Bayesianism alone is not su¢ cient to fully identify the revised
probability distribution bp. The reason is that reverse Bayesianism implies restrictions on the
revised probabilities of non-null states in the original state space (or, in the case of a new
act, their corresponding events in the expanded state space), but not on the probabilities
of new states in the expanded state space. In other words, reverse Bayesianism prescribes
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how probability mass shifts away from non-null states in the original state space to the
corresponding states or events in the expanded state space, but it does not dictate how the
shifted probability mass is distributed among the new states in the expanded state space.
This is where act independence comes in. It determines how the shifted probability mass
is apportioned among the new states. Together, reverse Bayesianism and act independence
fully identify the revised probability distribution bp.
How realistic is act independence? The answer depends on the nature of the specic
activities in question. For instance, the risk that fracking for natural gas results in ground-
water contamination is likely to be independent of the risk that importing liqueed natural
gas results in a re or explosion. By contrast, the risk of contracting HIV from sharing
drug injection needles is likely to be correlated with the risk of contracting HIV from having
unprotected sex, since both depend on the prevalence of HIV in the population.
Because there exist activities whose outcomes are not independent, it is useful to inves-
tigate the importance of the act independence assumption for our results.
New link. In the case of a new link, reverse Bayesianism alone implies bp1 = (1   )p1,bp2 = (1  )p2, and bp3 + bp4 = . Importantly, reverse Bayesianism alone is not su¢ cient to
separately identify bp3 and bp4. This leaves a set of posteriors bp. E¤ectively, unawareness has
been turned into ambiguity.18
As it turns out, this does not create an issue with respect to activity f1. Recall that, by
assumption, the regulator learns  (the probability that f1 yields z2). Because the e¢ cient
level of care for f1 is a function of the sum bp3+bp4, the regulator can stipulate a new standard
of care for f1 in terms of .
Relaxing act independence, however, creates ambiguity with respect to the revised risk
of activity f2. Because the e¢ cient level of care for f2 is a function of the sum bp2 + bp4,
without act independence (or another assumption that separately identies bp3 and bp4), the
18Dominiak and Tserenjigmid (2018) have a similar result. In their model, growing awareness extends
subjective expected utility preferences to maxmin expected utility preferences, and newly discovered events
can be ambiguous. Thus, reverse Bayesian belief revision can result in a set of posteriors.
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regulator cannot stipulate a precise new standard of care for f2. The best the regulator can
do is specify lower and upper bounds, using the knowledge that bp4 2 (0; ).
Of course, the ambiguity can be resolved if, by virtue of the discovery, the regulator
learns more about bp. For instance, if the regulator learns not only  but also either bp2 + bp4
(the revised probability that f2 yields z2) or bp4 (the joint probability that f1 and f2 yield
z2), this is su¢ cient to separately identify bp3 and bp4. With this, the regulator can stipulate
a precise new standard of care for f2.19
New act. In the case of a new act, reverse Bayesianism alone implies bp1 + bp5 = p1,bp2 + bp6 = p2, bp3 + bp7 = p3, bp4 + bp8 = p4, and bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8 = . Again, this leaves
a set of posteriors bp. Recall that the e¢ cient level of care for f1 is a function of the sumbp3+ bp4+ bp7+ bp8, which equals p3+p4; the e¢ cient level of care for f2 is a function of the sumbp2+ bp4+ bp6+ bp8, which equals p2+p4; and the e¢ cient level of care for f3 is a function of the
sum bp5+ bp6+ bp7+ bp8, which equals . Hence, even without act independence, the regulators
information is su¢ ciently precise (i) to know that she need not stipulate new standards of
care for activities f1 and f2 and (ii) to stipulate a standard of care for the new activity f3.
New consequence. In the case of a new consequence, reverse Bayesianism alone implies
bp1 = (1 )p1, bp2 = (1 )p2, bp3 = (1 )p3, bp4 = (1 )p4, and bp5+bp6+bp7+bp8+bp9 = . Once
again, this leaves a set of posteriors bp. By assumption, the regulator learns bp5 + bp6 + bp9 = 
(the probability that f1 yields z3) and bp7 + bp8 + bp9 =  (the probability that f2 yields z3).
Assume the regulator also learns bp9 (the joint probability that f1 and f2 yield z3), and letbp9 = . Note that  =  +    .
Recall that the e¢ cient level of care for activity f1 is a function of  and the sumbp3 + bp4 + bp8 (the revised probability that f1 yields z2), and the e¢ cient level of care for
activity f2 is a function of  and the sum bp2 + bp4 + bp6 (the revised probability that f2 yields
19We note that, in the case of a new link, reverse Bayesianism fully identies bp without act independence
if the probability that activity f2 yields harm z2 is unchanged by the discovery of the new link between f1
and z2 (i.e., 22 = p2 + p4 = bp2 + bp4 + bp4 = b22).
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z2). Without act independence, the sums bp3 + bp4 + bp8 and bp2 + bp4 + bp6 are only partially
identied (because bp6 and bp8 are not separately identied), creating ambiguity with respect
to the revised risks of both activities. As a result, the regulator cannot stipulate precise new
standards of care for activities f1 and f2. The best the regulator can do is specify bounds:
bx1 2 (1  )(p3 + p4)z2 + z3
2
;
((1  )(p3 + p4) + ) z2 + z3
2

and bx2 2 (1  )(p2 + p4)z2 + z3
2
;
((1  )(p2 + p4) + ) z2 + z3
2

:
As before, the ambiguity can be resolved if, by virtue of the discovery, the regulator
learns more about bp. For instance, if the regulator learns not only  and  but also either
bp3 + bp4 + bp8 or bp2 + bp4 + bp6, this is su¢ cient to separately identify bp5, bp6, bp7, and bp8. With
this, the regulator can stipulate precise new standards of care for f1 and f2.
In summary, without act independence, reverse Bayesianism only partially identies bp.
This does not create an issue in the case of a new act the regulators information is su¢ -
ciently precise to stipulate a standard of care with respect to each activity. In the case of a
new link or consequence, by contrast, the partial identication of bp creates ambiguity with
respect to the revised risk of one or both activities, leading to imprecise standards. This
ambiguity, however, can be resolved if the regulator learns more about bp. In other words,
the more the regulator learns about the new probability of harm, the less important is the
act independence assumption.
5 Conclusion
For economists who wish to incorporate unawareness and growing awareness into appli-
cations, reverse Bayesianism o¤ers an elegant choice-theoretic belief revision theory that
mirrors the familiar process of Bayesian updating. An important limitation of Karni and
Vierøs (2013) model, however, is that reverse Bayesianism alone does not fully determine the
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revised probability distribution over the expanded state space. We overcome this limitation
in a relatively simple way, by assuming that acts are statistically independent. We show
that with act independence, and knowledge of the probabilities of new act events in the ex-
panded state space, reverse Bayesianism fully determines the revised probability distribution
over the expanded state space in each case of growing awareness. In this way, we make a
contribution to the reverse Bayesian model and operationalize it for economic applications.20
To illustrate how act independence operationalizes reverse Bayesianism, we consider the
law and economics problem of safety regulation. We analyze how a safety regulator, in
the wake of growing awareness about the risky activities within her purview, revises her
beliefs about the risk of each activity and resets the safety standards for each activity. Of
course, unawareness and growing awareness via technological progress, scientic discovery,
or otherwise play an important role in many legal contexts. Accordingly, we believe that the
reverse Bayesian model could be fruitfully applied to study the implications of unawareness
and growing awareness for the economic analysis of numerous other legal subjects, including
contract remedies, criminal law, litigation and settlement, and tort law.
20At the same time, the model has other limitations that we do not address. For instance, Chambers and
Hayashi (2018) criticize its empirical content from a revealed preference perspective. They show that, in
the case of a new consequence, the model does not make singular predictions about observable choices over
feasible acts. Another limitation of the model is that it assumes a naive or myopic unawareness people
are unaware that they are unaware. A sophisticated unawareness, where people are aware that they are
unaware, may be more realistic. Aware of this limitation, Karni and Vierø (2017) extend their model to the
case of sophisticated unawareness. The end result is a generalization that maintains the avor of reverse
Bayesianism and nests the naive model as a special case.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
(i) Take any s 2 S. By reverse Bayesianism, we have jSj   1 linearly independent equations:
bp(t) = p(t)
p(s)
bp(s); 8 t 2 S, t 6= s. (1.1)
By the denition of  and
P
t2bS bp(t) = 1, we haveP
t2S bp(t) = 1  : (1.2)
Substituting (1.1) into (1.2), we have
bp(s) + X
t2S:t6=s
p(t)
p(s)
bp(s) = 1  ;
which implies bp(s) = (1  )p(s)P
t2S p(t)
= (1  )p(s); (1.3)
where the last equality follows from
P
t2S p(t) = 1.
(ii) Take any s 2 . By act independence,
bp(s) = Qmi=1 bp  Ai(si) :
Observe that bp  Al(sl) = bp (Al(zk)) =  and Ti 6=lAi(si) = L(s) [ fsg. It follows that
bp(s) = Qi 6=l bp  Ai(si) = bpTi 6=lAi(si)
= bp (L(s) [ fsg) =  [bp (L(s)) + bp(s)] ;
which implies bp(s) = 
1   bp(L(s)): (1.4)
Observe that L(s) is the union of all t 2 S such that ti = si for all i 6= l. It follows that
bp(L(s)) = Pt2L(s) bp(t) = Pt2L(s)(1  )p(t) = (1  )p(L(s)); (1.5)
where the second equality follows from (1.3). Substituting (1.5) back into (1.4), we havebp(s) = p(L(s)).
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Proof of Theorem 2
Take any s 2 S. By reverse Bayesianism, we have jSj   1 linearly independent equations:
p(t)bp(E(s)) = p(s)bp(E(t)); 8 t 2 S, t 6= s.
Summing the left- and right-hand sides, and adding p(s)bp(E(s)) to each side, yields
bp(E(s))Pt2S p(t) = p(s)Pt2S bp(E(t)):
Because
P
t2S p(t) = 1 and
P
t2S bp(E(t)) = 1, we have
bp(E(s)) = p(s): (2.1)
Take any sj 2 E(s), j 2 f1; : : : ; ng. By act independence,
bp(sj) = Qm+1i=1 bp  Ai(sij) :
Observe that bp  Am+1(sm+1j ) = bp (Am+1(zj)) = j and Tmi=1Ai(sij) = E(s). It follows that
bp(sj) = jQmi=1 bp  Ai(sij) = jbp  Tmi=1Ai(sij) = jbp (E(s)) : (2.2)
Substituting (2.1) into (2.2), we have bp(sj) = jp(s).
Proof of Theorem 3
(i) Take any s 2 S. By reverse Bayesianism, we have jSj   1 linearly independent equations:
p(t)bp(s) = p(s)bp(t); 8 t 2 S, t 6= s.
Summing the left- and right-hand sides, and adding p(s)bp(s) to each side, yields
bp(s)Pt2S p(t) = p(s)Pt2S bp(t):
Observe that
P
t2S p(t) = 1 and
P
t2S bp(t) = 1   = Qmi=1(1  i). Thus,
bp(s) = (1  )p(s) = (Qmi=1(1  i)) p(s): (3.1)
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(ii) Take any s 2  such that I(s) = fkg for any k 2 f1; : : : ;mg. By act independence,
bp(s) = Qmi=1 bp  Ai(si) :
Observe that bp  Ak(sk) = bp (Ak(zn+1)) = k. Thus,
bp(s) = kQi2I(s) bp  Ai(si) :
Observe that I(s) = fkg implies Ti2I(s)Ai(si) = C(s) [ fsg. Hence,
bp(s) = kQi2I(s) bp  Ai(si) = kbpTi2I(s)Ai(si)
= kbp (C(s) [ fsg) = k (bp (C(s)) + bp (s)) ;
which implies bp(s) = k
1  k bp (C(s)) : (3.2)
Observe that C(s) is the union of all t 2 S such that ti = si for all i 2 I(s). It follows that
bp(C(s)) = Pt2C(s) bp(t) = Pt2C(s)(1  )p(t) = (1  )p(C(s)); (3.3)
where the second equality follows from (3.1). Substituting (3.3) back into (3.2), we have
bp(s) = k
1  k (1  )p(C(s)) = k
Q
i2I(s)(1  i)p(C(s));
where the last equality follows from 1   = Qmi=1(1  i).
Next take any s 2  such that I(s) = fk; lg for any fk; lg  f1; : : : ;mg. By act
independence, bp(s) = Qmi=1 bp  Ai(si) :
Observe that bp  Ak(sk) = bp (Ak(zn+1)) = k. Thus,
bp(s) = kQi2fI(s)[flgg bp  Ai(si) :
Observe that I(s) = fk; lg implies Ti2fI(s)[flggAi(si) = D(s) [ fsg, where D(s)  fr 2  :
ri = si; 8 i 2 fI(s) [ flgg. Hence,
bp(s) = kQi2fI(s)[flgg bp  Ai(si) = kbpTi2fI(s)[flgAi(si)
= kbp (D(s) [ fsg) = k (bp (D(s)) + bp (s)) ;
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which implies bp(s) = k
1  k bp (D(s)) : (3.4)
Observe further that I(r) = flg for all r 2 D(s). It follows that
bp (D(s)) = Pt2D(s) bp(t)
=
P
t2D(s)
l
1  l (1  )p(C(t))
=
l
1  l (1  )p(C(s)): (3.5)
Substituting (3.5) back into (3.4), we have
bp(s) = k
1  k
l
1  l (1  )p(C(s)):
= kl
Q
i2I(s)(1  i)p(C(s)):
Proceeding in this fashion to consider s 2  such that I(s) is an -element subset of
f1; : : : ;mg for all  = 3; : : : ;m  1, we establish that
bp(s) = Qi2I(s) iQi2I(s)(1  i) p (C(s))
for all s 2  such that I(s)  f1; : : : ;mg.
(iii) Take the s 2  such that I(s) = f1; : : : ;mg. By act independence, bp(s) =Qm
i=1 bp (Ai(si)). Observe that bp (Ai(si)) = bp (Ai(zn+1)) = i for all i 2 I(s). Because
I(s) = f1; : : : ;mg, we have bp(s) = Qmi=1 i.
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